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The Tension Between Practical and Theoretical
Legal Education: A Judge's View of the Gap
The Honorable Sherman G . Finesilver*
The Gee-Jackson study, a critical examination of American
legal education, may be as significant for the legal profession as
the Flexner report1 was for the medical profession. In order to
prepare their study, the authors visited ten American law schools,
distributed lengthy questionnaires to selected law professors and
students, and interviewed English legal educators. They utilized
a consequential or "functional': method of analysis which considers all proposed changes in view of their probable results. The
authors have drawn principally upon their own multidisciplined
experience as legal and political science educators, as well as
upon the critical studies of others, in order to produce a work
having potential impact throughout the legal profession.
Collaborative projects on legal education are not new to the
authors. They have jointly prepared two prior studies that examined law school curricula. In the instant collaboration, they have
endeavored to present and evaluate the latest thinking and trends
in legal education in a historical and comparative context. This
Commentary is a critical presentation of the principal themes
and conclusions of the study, together with my own proposed
resolutions to some of the problems raised by the authors.

The central theme of the Gee-Jackson study is raised a t the
very beginning: that there is a recurring tension between the
"practical" and "theoretical" aspects of legal education? The law
school method of teaching future lawyers, which has remained
essentially intact over the past century, is primarily
* United States District Judge, District of Colorado. The research assistance of Peter
R. Osinoff, Esq., is gratefully acknowledged.
1. A. FLEXNER,
MEDICAL
EDUCATION
IN THE UNITEDSTATESAND CANADA
(Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching Bull. No. 4, 1910). Abraham Flexner, an
educator, prepared a report on medical schools in 1910 for the Carnegie Foundation for
the Advancement of Teaching. He urged that the clinical and classroom approaches be
merged and that medical schools be associated both with the university and with a hospital.
2. In this regard the instant report is reminiscent of the Flexner report on medical
education. Id.
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"theoretical." The consequence of this "theoretical" training has
been the growth of a dichotomy between an attorney's activities
as a law student and as a member of the practicing bar. It is
widely recognized t h a t a student's legal training is not
"complete," in any sense of that term, until the student has
actually practiced law for a few years. The authors go one step
further and claim that unless the student becomes affiliated-at
the public's ultimate expense-with a large law firm or government agency where his activities receive careful supervision, the
student will probably not be trained as a fully "competent" lawyer. The problem with this solution, as the authors note, is that
most students never have an opportunity to fill such elite positions. Law schools, therefore, must bear more of the responsibility
for training their students.
The practical-theoretical dichotomy has generated a perception among many law students and attorneys that the law school
experience is both unrealistic and irrelevant. Faced with the
problem of how legal education can produce competent practicing
attorneys, the authors examine the more important solutions that
have been recently proposed and implemented.
According to the authors-and one can hardly disagree-the
most important, widespread change in American legal education
during the past decade has been the development of clinical law
school courses. This teaching method gives the student an opportunity to study law from the perspective of a practitioner. The
student will inevitably become more involved in a well-run clinical course, because what he does in such a course is, after all, the
raison d'etre for law school. The student is playing the role of a
functioning attorney. Because it is still a part of law school, a
clinical course also compels the student to perform an evaluative
examination of the legal system. A practicing lawyer, on the other
hand, would have to readjust his time commitments in order to
perform such a critical analysis voluntarily. Finally, and quite
significantly, clinical courses provide the best vehicle for the exposure and examination of problems in legal ethics, a subject that
has skyrocketed in attention in the shadow of Watergate.
The lessons of Watergate, as opposed to the canons of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, cannot best be taught in traditional classroom courses on legal ethics. Nor do special bar
examinations on ethics "weed out" the type of person who would
use a position of authority in ways that are "above the law,"
underhanded, or uncivil. A person's character, good and bad habits, and tendencies are largely formed and developed long before
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he enters law school. Thus, there is a tremendous responsibility
placed on law school admissions committees in the admissions
process.
However, there are particular ethical problems that emerge
out of one's status as an attorney-such as problems of whom a
lawyer may represent in particular circumstances-that should
be taught in law schools. While some of these ethical problems
may be encountered in traditional "casebook" courses, the
unique difficulties emerging from the attorney's role in an adversary system and in society may be most clearly examined in clinical courses where a law student actually experiences this role.
Optimistically, the confrontation and exploration of these problems in a clinical course taught by a member of the practicing bar
will make the student a better, more confident, and more civil
member of the legal profession. At the same time, members of the
practicing bar will become more involved in law school activities.
Ultimately, the sagging public image of the legal profession would
improve as a result of the admission to practice of those who have
deeply considered their roles in the adversary system and society.
No casebook courses in the Code of Professional Responsibility
can possibly have such an ameliorative effect.

II. THECHALLENGE
AND PROMISE
OF CLINICAL
LEGAL
EDUCATION
Clinical legal education today, however, is beset with problems. Students in clinical courses must be closely supervised, and
teachers must make themselves readily available. Because of the
limited number of dedicated and experienced clinical instructors,
few students can be exposed to this type of education. In addition, clinical courses have created scheduling difficulties for students who take traditional courses a t the same time. Not only are
there generally few clinical courses to choose from, but the time
requirements for a clinical course often conflict with those of a
student's other courses. Moreover, clinical teaching materials,
such as videotapes, are more expensive than those of the traditional casebook courses. As a result, a fruitful clinical course may
be as inaccessible to the average law student as a large law firm.
It has been difficult to interest outstanding members of the
local bar in becoming clinical instructors a t law schools and even
more difficult to retain them for a substantial period of time.
Clinical instructors seek to return to practice or to move into
traditional academia, either because of workload pressures or
because of the low level of faculty prestige that is accorded to
clinicians. The authors emphasize that while there is pressure
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from students and from some members of the active bar and
judiciary for law schools to develop clinical programs, theoretical
legal education and "bar exam" type courses are still the most
highly regarded. Law school faculty members look upon an image
of their law school as a "trade school" with a marked degree of
disdain. Tenure is generally awarded to those professors who have
made substantial academic contributions, not to "mere clinicians" who have little time for thorough academic research.
Despite these problems, clinical legal education is an extremely positive development. The legitimacy and utility of these
courses are no longer open to debate. The clinical phase of legal
education has grown enormously within the past ten years, both
in number of subjects covered and in number of overall programs.
With certain attitudinal changes toward legal education, the
problems enumerated above can be virtually eliminated. With
the increasing awareness that clinical education is a permanent
innovation, there will undoubtedly be greater demand for
clinician-professors. A greater clinical orientation a t law schools
will lead to tenure for clinical instructors and the institution of
clinical professorships. These incentives, together with the recognition that clinical courses are necessary to produce competent
attorneys, will attract and maintain the interest of outstanding
and dedicated clinical faculty membew3
The cost of clinical education programs is one objection to
their implementation. It should be noted, however, that while the
cost of clinical courses is greater than that of traditional courses,
the cost of providing a legal education is significantly less than
that of providing a scientific or medical education. The authors
point out that while law school tuition is high, university presidents use law schools as a means of raising money for other, less
self-sustaining academic programs. Another economic factor to
consider is that once standard course materials are developed for
clinical programs, their subsequent reuse from year to year will
reduce both the cost of clinical courses and faculty preparation
time.
More importantly, clinical courses may ultimately provide a
means of obtaining significantly more financial support from the
3. Difficulties with scheduling clinical courses can be resolved both by increasing the
number of clinical offerings and, as the authors note, by introducing the concept of clinical
semesters. In this connection, the authors discuss three law schools-Northeastern University School of Law, Southwestern University School of Law, and Antioch School of
Law-that have radically restructured their curricula in order to accommodate extensive
clinical programs.

,
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practicing bar. The authors deplore the lack of support for law
schools by their graduates. As long as law schools leave the practical aspects of legal education to the practicing bar, lawyers may
not feel that requests for extensive financial support of law
schools are compelling. Clinical courses, however, represent the
recognition by law schools that they must bear some of the burden of training future lawyers in practical aspects of the profession. With the introduction of clinical programs, law schools may
be able to forge a closer bond between themselves and the remainder of the legal world. In time, the practicing bar may take a more
active interest in the support, financial and otherwise, of law
schools.
Unlike the authors, I do not view the introduction of "legal
clinics" a t law schools with trepidation. If high quality clinical
instructors can be attracted by an increase in the prestige of
clinical teaching methods, students will receive the necessary
individualized attention. The advent of legal clinics a t law
schools is likely to result in greater student supervision than
many forms of clinical externships a t public law offices outside
law schools-or at law offices after law school-where the practitioners are often too burdened to give students much guidance.
In addition, law school legal clinics may provide a valuable link
between law schools and surrounding communities.
In summary, once clinical courses are recognized as being as
important for legal education as traditional "bar" subjects, many
of the initial problems of innovation will be overcome. The development of clinical programs at law schools is not, I think, a passing fancy, but offers an opportunity to work out a resolution to
the practical-theoretical dichotomy that has plagued university
legal education. A t the same time, however, it is neither necessary nor wise to abandon the basic classroom courses which help
develop the student's analytic skills as well as provide a working
knowledge of substantive law.

ID. EDUCATIONAL
INNOVATIONS
ON THE HORIZON
While the development of clinical courses has been the most
fundamental change in university-based legal education, there
have been other innovations whose full potential has not yet been
realized. One area of innovation has been in the interdisciplinary
programs that have burgeoned in recent years. While such programs shorten the time required for obtaining degrees in both
fields, the authors have found that interdisciplinary curricula are
not as popular among students as are clinical courses. Many stu-
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dents have discovered that it is extremely difficult to unify two
subjects of study, particularly where each department maintains
its own course requirements. Other students have complained
that an interdisciplinary program dilutes one's legal education.
Perhaps because of pressure from state bar associations, law
schools have been jealous of the number of law credits they are
willing to relinquish to another department. In my view, however,
a humanistic orientation to the law, or a perspective on the role
of law from other fields of study, is more important for an attorney than total immersion in the technicalities of the legal process.
An interdisciplinary approach could also be beneficial from
another standpoint. If many law school courses, particularly
those with relevance to other academic fields, were opened to
other interested students on the campus, law schools might help
remedy the deplorable lack of understanding of legal thinking,
the legal profession, and the legal system prevalent even among
the most educated nonlawyers in our society.
The age of technology has not left the law untouched. Among
the more significant technological developments in legal education are videotape, computer-assisted research, and computer
teaching. In my view, videotape may be the most important of
these developments, a t least for purposes of legal instruction.
Videotape usage is particularly useful in clinical courses, both to
bring the courtroom presentation of a case into a classroom for
purposes of detailed analysis and to call the student's attention
to his own mistakes in a more apparent and meaningful way. The
computer is probably a more valuable tool for legal research than
for legal education. Because there may be several correct answers
to legal problems, or problems of case interpretation, computer
teaching programs may be difficult to construct. In addition, oral
exercise would be lacking.
The authors discuss another alternative to the "case
method" t h a t has been implemented in a special program
(SCALE)4a t Southwestern University Law School in Los Angeles. The first year in the program is devoted to classroom work
organized around concepts such as negligence, estoppel, and
causation rather than around areas of law such as torts and contracts. The second and final year (there is almost no summer
break) is spent in classroom "transactions" wherein particular
problems are analyzed. The professor plays the role of a senior
partner, and each student becomes the professor's associate.
4. SCALE stands for "Southwestern's Conceptual Approach to Legal Education.''
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There is also a fourteen week externship during the second year.
Only time and adequate study will reveal the benefits and drawbacks of such a program.
The example of Southwestern illustrates that we should not
feel that we are monogamously wedded to the case method as the
only means of classroom instruction. On the other hand, I do not
believe that the case method should be abandoned. Its almost
universal utilization throughout American legal education underscores the fact that it is based on the essential role of judicial
interpretation in our legal system.

IV. STRUCTURAL
REFORM
OF LEGAL
EDUCATION

Q

A myriad of "structural reforms" have been advanced, most
of which are intended to inject a dosage of the practical aspects
of lawyering into law school a t the expense of traditional classroom education. Some of the most significant of these proposals
will now be considered.
The Carrington committee report5and Dean Michael Sovern
of Columbia Law School6have suggested that the final year of law
school be devoted to specialization in an area of interest to the
student. The Carrington plan simply calls for a two-year basic
curriculum with an optional third year for those who wish to
specialize. Dean Sovern suggests a third year of law practice-an
externship-followed by a mandatory return to academia for a
fourth year of study in an area of interest to the student. A specific problem with the Carrington plan is that it is difficult for
most students to decide upon an area of specialization without
substantial prior exposure to actual practice. I also suspect that
few students would opt to take a third year of specialized courses
if they had the opportunity to practice law after two years of
study.
Bayless Manning, former Dean of Stanford Law School, has
suggested that law school consist of two years of classroom work
In effect, he eliminates Dean
and one year of apprentice~hip.~
Sovern's requirement that students return for a fourth year of
specialized training.
5. CURRICULUM
STUDY
PROJECT
COMMITTEE,
ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICAN
LAWSCHOOLS,
TRAINING
FOR THE PUBLIC
PROFESSIONS
OF THE LAW:1971, at 1 (P. Carrington ed. 1971)
(AALS 1971 Annual Meeting Proceedings, Part One, Section 11).
6. Sovern, Training Tomorrow's Lawyers: A Response to the Chief Justice's
Challenge, 11 COLUM.
J . LAW& SOC.PROB.72 (1974).
7. Manning, Law Schools and Lawyer Schools-Two-Tiered Legal Education, 26 J .
LEGAL
EDUC.379 (1974).
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Professor Thomas Bergin of the University of Virginia Law
School has suggested that law schools have two s track^."^ The
J.D. track would be oriented toward the practical aspects of legal
practice, while a more specialized Ph.D. track would adhere to a
traditional academic format. Currently, many of the foremost law
schools offer an advanced doctorate in law. Such programs, however, generally extend two or more years beyond the regular law
school curriculum and are not very popular among American law
students. Moreover, such J.S.D. programs do not consist of taking courses, but are based upon individual research. Professor
Ehrlich and the late Professor Packer of Stanford have suggested
that law schools offer various options for different types of stud e n t ~Rather
.~
than reconciling the theoretical and practical aspects of legal education in a single format, these plans permit the
student to choose his own approach.
Justin Stanley, former President of the American Bar Association (ABA), has suggested a two-year law school program, followed by continuing legal education (CLE) under the direction of
the bar for the improvement of the practical skills of advocacy.1°
I believe that one's legal education (although not necessarily
one's classroom legal education) prior to becoming a full-time
practicing attorney should be a t least three years in length. Legal
education is quite different from one's prior academic experience.
Law school must not only administer heavy doses of analytical
problems, but also must "bridge the gap" between a broadly
based humanistic education (or a specialized education in a foreign field) and one's professional life as a competent lawyer. In
my view, a two-year law school program would be inadequate
without the development of a highly structured CLE program. Of
the several alternative means of monitoring and improving professional fitness," the two plans most likely to be adopted, mandatory CLE and certification of specialists, are discussed a t
length below.

Mandatory CLE has undergone great study, and five states
8. Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REV.637
(1968).
& T. EHRLICH,
NEWDIRECTIONS
IN LEGAL
EDUCATION
(1972).
9. H. PACKER
10. Stanley, Two Years
LEARNING
AND THE LAW,Winter 1977, at 18.
11. These means include voluntary CLE, mandatory CLE, peer review, voluntary
self-assessment testing, mandatory periodic examinations, selective monitoring by a bar
commission, and certification of specialists.

+,

1
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have adopted mandatory CLE plans. Gee and Jackson raise
doubts about the value of mandatory CLE. Optimism about
mandatory CLE programs may be unfounded because these programs consist only of an hourly requirement rather than a course
requirement. A mandatory hourly requirement could degenerate
into spending particular amounts of time a t conventions or conferences, thereby serving primarily as a means of obtaining vacation time and a tax deduction. In my view, if CLE programs were
operated as an integral part of law schools, with an emphasis on
course requirements, effective legal education could occur and
the affiliation between law schools and the active bar and bench
would grow.
While certification of specialists is more efficient than mandatory CLE, the authors caution that it may be used as an instrument for charging higher legal fees. Specialists in particular fields
of law are undoubtedly necessary for "big business" or government agency work. However, I particularly support the concept
of specialists in advocacy. In a section stimulated by Chief Justice Burger's fine anglophiliac article, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates
Essential to Our System of Justice?,12 the authors compare the
English and American systems of legal education. They conclude
t h a t advocacy specialization, not English legal education, accounts for the acknowledged superiority of English advocates.
Specialization, unlike legal education a t the Inns of Court, which
the authors consider inferior to the average American law
school,13 had its origin early in the development of the English
legal system. According to the authors, the following factors contribute to the superiority of English advocates over their American counterparts: first, no English student is compelled to become a courtroom advocate; second, those secondary students
with outstanding oral skills are more easily noticed in a smaller
country and thus are channeled into becoming barristers; third,
the screening process continues during a student's term a t the
Inns and during pupilage; and, fourth, barristers are hired by
solicitors. An advocacy specialization in America would entail a
significant revision of the nature of our profession, but I believe
that the results would be well worth the effort.
12. 42 FORDHAM
L. REV.227 (1973).
13. Indeed, the Ormrod Committee, formed in 1967 to study legal education in England, has recommended that the training of English lawyers be transferred to the university as in America. REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE
ON LEGAL
EDUCATION,
CMND.NO. 4595, at
43-49 (1971).
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ROLEOF LEGALEDUCATION

The authors conclude that although contemporary legal education is a t the height of a reformist mood, major change is not
likely. Implementation of a durable educational innovation is
unlikely because such reformation requires a widely perceived
need for change and an innovating educational institution with
great prestige-such as Harvard Law School in the late 1800's.
According to surveys conducted by the authors, while student
demand has generated clinical courses, the casebook method and
traditional classroom techniques continue to fulfill faculty needs
and desires. The need for innovation, in short, has not been
widely perceived.
According to the authors, law schools generate their own
prestige-of-subject ranking, with subjects of greater abstract intellectual difficulty at the top. At the same time, however, the
authors found that many students would like more emphasis on
the teaching of practical aspects of law, including greater emphasis upon substantive law (although fewer students at top law
schools desire more emphasis upon substantive law). The coexistence of these prestige rankings and the apparently dissimilar desire of students for more substantive law courses is illustrative of
the "schizophrenia" in legal education, the tension between academia and the practicing bar, between the theoretical and the
practical. The authors feel that this tension is due, in part, to the
mixed self-perception of the legal profession: are lawyers simply
legal technicians or are they social engineers? Does a lawyer best
perform his social function simply by serving the needs of his
client within the advocacy system or by acting for particular social goals?
In my view, however, the theoretical courses in law school do
not transform students into social architects. Rather, I believe
that the nature of the attorney, apart from his law school experience, largely controls his social viewpoint and the value that the
lawyer places on pro bono publico, government, or private work.
I agree with the authors that society needs lawyers with a knowledge of other disciplines, a sense of history, and a profound awareness of ethical questions. I do not foresee, however, that such
understanding will be obtained in law school courses, albeit issues
of history and ethics should be raised in them.
It is the duty of every lawyer to approach each legal problem
not only with his technical tools but also with his knowledge of
our society and its legal system. A lawyer must always be conscious of the morality and the social consequences of his action.
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To be a lawyer places one in the position of making value judgments. There is a social aspect to each case. An attorney is obligated to act in the best interests of his client, but the question is
whether this obligation should include action that would protect
socially questionable activities of his client. In my view, the real
sin of Watergate is in having a total obliviousness to everything
but the immediate needs of one's client. Clinical or traditional
courses infused with practical considerations may be utilized to
train lawyers to consider both the immediate analytic aspects as
well as the larger social context of each case. While law schools
cannot train lawyers to be ethical or teach lawyers what values
to place on particular cases, practically oriented courses may
compel students to confront and consider what type of lawyer's
role they may fulfill.
Although law school cannot instill a code of ethics in the
student's mind, it can help to make students truly civil practitioners. Law schools must teach their students proper preparation
that will minimize the cost of litigation and prevent a waste of
court time. The propriety and ultimate usefulness of harrassing
litigation tactics should be discussed in law school courses. In my
view, an advocate gains more for all his clients by endeavoring not
to raise irritants in each case. An adversary system operates best
when its advocates are most civil. American lawyers are regarded
throughout the world as being the most knowledgeable specialists
in many substantive fields of law. If American legal educators
were to train students in the skills of advocacy as another specialty, and were to compel a thorough consideration of the difficult role of an advocate in the adversary system, we would improve both the competency and public image of the bar.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Gee-Jackson study is excellent. It is full of useful information and can serve as a blueprint for action by legal academicians, bench, and bar. Its message is clear-legal education and
the legal profession are a t a crossroads, and formalized legal education must be tested in the crucible of today's adversary system.
The study's reading and analysis are mandatory if our legal structure is to continue to have the resiliency to withstand the pressures of America's legalistic society.

